A Stackelberg security Markov game based on partial information for strategic decision making against unexpected attacks
Abstract
This paper considers an important class of Stackelberg security problems, which is characterized by the fact that defenders and attackers have incomplete information at each stage about the value of the current state. The inability to observe the exact state is motivated by the fact that it is impossible to measure exactly the state variables of the defenders and attackers. Most existing approaches for computing Stackelberg security games provide no guarantee if the estimated model is inaccurate.
Comparison of the costs of the defined-benefit and the defined-contribution schemes under an actuarial methodology
Resumen
El objetivo de este trabajo es utilizar herramientas básicas de análisis actuarial para demostrar por primera vez que el costo del financiamiento del esquema de beneficio-definido es igual al de un esquema de contribución-definida siempre que estos planes otorguen beneficios iguales en términos de cantidad y condiciones para obtenerlos, y llevamos a cabo nuestros cálculos usando las mismas hipótesis financieras y biométricas.